State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan
[Civil Appeal No. 10613 of 2014 arising out of SLP (C) No.36237 of
2012]
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Order
dated 20th March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ
Appeal No.262 of 2010.
3. The question raised for our consideration is whether the
refusal by the competent authority to give compassionate appointment in police
service on the ground of criminal Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237
of 2012 antecedents of a candidate who is acquitted for want of evidence or who
is discharged from the criminal case on account of compounding can be
justified.
4. Sultan Khan was serving with the Madhya Pradesh Police. He died
in harness on 21st June, 2005. His son, the respondent Parvez Khan, applied for
compassionate appointment. The competent authority sent his record for police
verification. It was found that he was involved in two criminal cases. In one
case, he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325, 294 and
506-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other under Sections 452, 394 and
395 of the Indian Penal Code. The Superintendent of Police held that he was not
eligible for appointment in Government service and closed his case.
5. The respondent challenged the said order by way of Writ
Petition No.15052 of 2008 on the ground that in the first case he was acquitted
on 31st January, 2007 and in the second he was discharged on account of
compounding of offence.
6. Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in his contention
in the writ petition and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Division Bench
took a different view. It was held that the object of verification was to
verify suitability of a candidate Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237
of 2012 for employment. Since the respondent was acquitted in both the criminal
cases he could not be considered unsuitable. No reason had been given as to why
after acquittal in the criminal case, the respondent was considered to be
unsuitable. Accordingly, the Division Bench directed consideration of case of
the respondent afresh in the light of observations in the order within three
months. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Learned counsel for the State submitted that since on police
verification, it was found that the respondent was involved in criminal cases
involving moral turpitude, he could not be given appointment. Mere acquittal
for want of evidence or discharge on account of compromise could not be taken
to be conclusive for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminal
proceedings was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate for recruitment to
police service.
9. It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot be
punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but the standard of proof
required for consideration of suitability or otherwise of a candidate was not
the same. Discharge on Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended upon the attitude
of the parties.
The victim may be prepared to settle the matter for any
consideration other than innocence of the accused, but it did not wash off the
criminal antecedents of an accused. Entering into police service required a
candidate to be of character, integrity and clean antecedents. If a person is
acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely
involved and he had no criminal antecedents. All that may be inferred is that
he has not been proved to be guilty. Reliance has been placed on the decision
of this Court in Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh1.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned
order and submitted that some other similarly placed candidates had been given
compassionate appointment. Two such instances have been pointed out by the
respondent in the counter affidavit. He has also submitted that the State of
Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003 for character
verification of candidates for recruitment to Government service and such
guidelines do no justify rejection of candidature of the respondent. One of the
instances given is of Dilip Kumar Samadhiya son of Shri Jagdish Prasad 1 2013
(7) SCC 685 Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 Samadhiya
against whom three criminal cases were registered prior to the recruitment in
Government service but he was acquitted either on account of compromise or on
account of benefit of doubt.
Still, he was given appointment. Similarly, Jitender Sharma was
recruited to Police service though he was tried for a criminal case, but
acquitted on account of compounding or on the basis of benefit of doubt. As per
Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003, an independent view can be taken only where
candidate has concealed the information about pendency of trial and not where
there is no such concealment, as in the present case.
11. After due consideration, we are of the view that the impugned
order cannot be sustained. Refusal by the competent authority to recruit the
respondent on the ground of criminal antecedents is not liable to be interfered
with. The applicable Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003 inter alia provide :
"On the basis of merits and demerits by the Hon'ble Court the acquitted
candidate will be eligible for the Government Service." The above
guidelines show that acquittal is not conclusive. Even after acquittal, basis
of order of the Court has to be gone into by the competent authority.
Even after order based on Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C)
No.36237 of 2012 compromise or lack of evidence may render a candidate
ineligible. In the present case, the relevant part of the order of the
Superintendent of Police is as follows: "Action was taken in regard to the
proceedings of compassionate appointment, character verification was got done,
wherein vide Letter No.V.S./21/VHR/2007/17(F)283/07 dated 17.9.2007 of the
Police Headquarters it was informed that a case under Section 294, 323, 506,
324, 34 of IPC had been registered against the applicant in Police Station
Kotwali as Crime No.185/06 and the applicant was acquitted on the basis of a
compromise by the Court on 23.2.2007.
In the same manner in Crime No.494/06 under Section 394, 364, 451
of IPC a case was registered and vide judgment dated 31.1.2007 of the Court he
was acquitted. Two separate crimes had been registered against the applicant,
wherein in one case Section 394, 451, 365 of IPC are there and which come in
the category of moral turpitude. In the judgment of the Court benefit of doubt
has been given, therefore, as per the new guidelines of 2003 issued by the
Government of Madhya Pradesh in respect of character verification the applicant
Parvez Khan alias Sonu alias Raja has been found to be ineligible for
Government service."
12. In Mehar Singh (supra), the question considered by this Court
was as follows :
"18.The question before this Court is whether the candidature
of the respondents who had made a clean breast of their involvement in a
criminal case by mentioning this fact in their application/attestation form
while applying for a post of Constable in Delhi Police, who were Civil Appeal
No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 provisionally selected subject to verification
of their antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted/discharged in the
criminal case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi
Police on the ground that they are not found suitable for appointment to the
post of Constable." After considering the rival contentions, the Court
held :
"23.A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that
the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave
cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or
discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds
or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel
the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious
flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material
witnesses turning hostile.
It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who
will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely
to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to
consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and
his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation
rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi
Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to
be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police
force.
24.We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the
respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments
of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of corelation between a
criminal case and a departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but,
support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection
with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical, namely, whether to
allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department.
While Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 the
standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt,
the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite
often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such
acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt
would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged
trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P.
Kapur v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787] this Court has taken a view that
departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the
acquittal is other than honourable.
25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was considered
by this Court in S. Samuthiram [2013 (1) SCC 598]. In that case this Court was
concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section
509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that
case because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two
material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in
RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [1994 (1) SCC 541] where in somewhat similar fact
situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an
employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by
giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal,
this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the
punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings.
This Court observed that the expressions "honourable
acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully
exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code.
They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is
meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". This Court expressed
that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution
case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against
the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
26.In light of the above, we are of the opinion that since the
purpose of the departmental proceedings is to keep persons, who are guilty of
serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of
moral turpitude, out of the department, if found necessary, because they
pollute the department, surely the above principles will apply with more vigour
at the point of entry of a person in the police department i.e. at the time of recruitment.
If it is found by the Screening Committee that the person against whom a
serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on technical
grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but the acquittal is not honourable,
the Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter
norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary force
because public interest is involved in it.
27. Against the above background, we shall now examine what is the
nature of acquittal of the respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji
Lal, respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda,
stones, etc. stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared
to take the fare from one of their associates. Those who intervened were beaten
up. They received injuries. The miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the
bus by throwing stones. The complainant was also injured. This incident is
undoubtedly an incident affecting public order. The assault on the conductor
was preplanned and premeditated.
The FIR was registered under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC.
The order dated 30-1-2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Khetri shows that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 IPC are
concerned, the accused entered into a compromise with the complainant. Hence,
the learned Magistrate acquitted respondent Mehar Singh and others of the said
offences. The order further indicates that so far as offence of rioting i.e.
offence under Section 147 IPC is concerned, three main witnesses turned
hostile.
The learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of
the said offence. This acquittal can never be described as an acquittal on
merits after a full-fledged trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry
in Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 the police force by
portraying this acquittal as an honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no
discussion on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar Singh has not
been exonerated after evaluation of the evidence.
28.So far as respondent Shani Kumar is concerned, the FIR lodged
against him stated that he along with other accused abused and threatened the
complainant's brother. They opened fire at him due to which he sustained bullet
injuries. The offences under Sections 307, 504 and 506 IPC were registered
against respondent Shani Kumar and others. The order dated 14-5-2010 passed by
the Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the injured
person did not support the prosecution case. They were declared hostile. Hence,
the learned Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted
them. This again is not a clean acquittal. The use of firearms in this manner
is a serious matter. For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on
benefit of doubt in a serious case of this nature is bound to act as an
impediment.
29.In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil Kumar
[1996(11) CC 605]. In that case, the respondent therein had appeared for
recruitment as a Constable in Delhi Police Services. He was selected
provisionally, but, his selection was subject to verification of character and
antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his
antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not
found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal allowed the application on the ground that since the
respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under
Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34 and Section 324 IPC, he cannot be
denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. This Court
disapproved of the Tribunal's view.
It was observed that verification of the character and antecedents
is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is
suitable for the post under the State. This Court observed that though the
candidate Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 was provisionally
selected, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint him on
account of his antecedent record and this view taken by the appointing
authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted.
Whether the respondent was discharged or acquitted of the criminal
offences, the same has nothing to do with the question as to whether he should
be appointed to the post. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of
the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof.
30.It was argued that Sushil Kumar must be distinguished from the
facts of the instant case because the respondent therein had concealed the fact
that a criminal case was registered against him, whereas, in the instant case
there is no concealment. It is not possible for us to accept this submission.
The aspect of concealment was not considered in Sushil Kumar at all. This Court
only concentrated on the desirability to appoint a person, against whom a
criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushil Kumar cannot be
restricted to cases where there is concealment of the fact by a candidate that
a criminal case was registered against him. When the point of concealment or
otherwise and its effect was not argued before this Court, it cannot be said
that in Sushil Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the
cases where there is concealment of facts.
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33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case
appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant
to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will
frustrate the purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no
merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to
bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a
quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases
and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation. But these Civil
Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 considerations cannot be brought
in here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the
Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it
appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for
that.
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35.The police force is a
disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and
order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence
in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character
and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that
acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has
been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking
to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force.
The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking
decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the
Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent
times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police
personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain
and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a
beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and
efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi
Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not
enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive
to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with
an even hand."
13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of Civil Appeal
No. of 2014 @ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012 confidence and must be a person of
utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely
exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought
not to enter the police force.
No doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the
case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for
the Respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into
the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is
no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the
decision is shown to be perverse or irrational. There is no material to show
that the appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is
acquittal for want of evidence or discharge based on compounding.
14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited
can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the matter was also gone into
by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was held : Civil Appeal No. of 2014
@ SLP (C) No.36237 of 2012
"36.The Screening Committee's proceedings have been assailed
as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see
no evidence of this. However, certain instances have been pointed out where
allegedly persons involved in serious offences have been recommended for
appointment by the Screening Committee.
It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. This
doctrine does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur (2010 (11) SCC 455).
It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud because it embodies a positive
concept. If the Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the
object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people with doubtful
background do not enter the police force, deviates from the policy, makes
exception and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of
committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but we cannot allow
that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents to rely on such
cases.
It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the
Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the police force in any
case and to take remedial action if he finds that it has done so. Public
interest demands an in-depth examination of this allegation at the highest
level. Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for the spurt
in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into
the matter and if there is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps
forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is strictly
implemented."
15. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the view
that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in interfering with
the order rejecting the claim of the respondent Civil Appeal No. of 2014 @ SLP
(C) No.36237 of 2012 for recruitment to the police service by way of giving him
compassionate appointment.
16. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned
order. There will be no order as to costs.
..................J. (T.S. THAKUR)
..................J. (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 1, 2014.
